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Unemployment Insurance: Good Cause For
Leaving Employment
Gerry Davidson*

T

behind the enactment of unemployment insurance programs have been enunciated as follows:

HE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES

Unemployment insurance is a program-established under Federal
and State law-for income maintenance during periods of involuntary unemployment due to lack of work, which provides partial compensation for wage loss as a matter of right, with dignity and dispatch, to eligible individuals. It helps to maintain purchasing power
and to stabilize the economy. It helps to prevent the dispersal of
the employers' trained work force, the sacrifice of skills, and the
breakdown of labor standards during temporary unemployment.l
However, there are certain requirements a claimant must fulfill before he can be entitled to receive such benefits. One of these is that the
worker must have left his employment for "good cause."
"Good cause" and "just cause" have been used synonymously in
the interpretation of unemployment compensation statutes which qualify,
or disqualify, an individual for such benefits. 2 However, according to
Black's Law Dictionary, "good cause" means "substantial reason, one
that affords a legal excuse," 3 whereas, "just cause" is defined as "a
cause outside legal cause, which must be based on reasonable grounds,
and there must be fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good
faith." 4 Thus, there seem to be two approaches in determining what
constitutes "good cause." The more liberal approach uses a standard
of reasonableness as applied to the ordinarily intelligent man.5 The more
conservative approach is to determine whether the cause for leaving employment was of a necessitous or compelling nature.0
"Good cause" and "personal reasons" for quitting employment connote "real circumstances, substantial reasons, objective conditions, palpable forces producing correlative results, adequate excuses which will
bear the test of reason, just grounds for action, and good faith." 7
* B.B.A., Ohio University; Third-year student at Cleveland State University College
of Law; Law clerk of the Legal Aid Society of Cleveland.
1 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF FEDERAL POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE FEDERAL-STATE EMPLOYMENT SEcUrrY
PROGRAM, GENERAL ADMINISTRATION LETTER No. 305, April 25, 1965.

2 Frigidaire Div. General Motors Corp. v. Board of Review, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 97 N.E.2d 96 (Ohio C.P. Montgomery County 1950); Chalker v.

First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., 126 N.E.2d 475 (Ohio C.P. Summit County 1955).
3 BLACx's LAW DICTIONARY, 822 (1968 rev. ed.).

4 Id. at 1001.
5 Harp v. Adm'r, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 230 N.E.2d 376 (Ohio
C.P. Hamilton County 1967).
6 Imre v. Catherwood, 27 App. Div. 2d 970, 279 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1967); Weiss v. Catherwood, 26 App. Div. 2d 851, 274 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1966); Mee's Bakery v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review, 162 Pa. Super. 183, 56 A.2d 386 (1948).
7 Mee's Bakery v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 162 Pa. Super. 183,
56 A.2d 386 (1948).
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Whichever of the two approaches is used, the question of whether the
claimant left his employment with or without "good cause" is one of
fact for determination by an unemployment compensation board of review.8 The sections of the Ohio Revised Code pertaining to the Unemployment Compensation Act, 9 do not define "good cause." Therefore,
each case must be determined on its own facts and circumstances. 10 In
Layton v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, the court held it to
be just cause for an individual to leave his employment for a better
paying position. It was further stated that the claimant, after being
separated from the new employment after one week was entitled to
unemployment benefits due to a lack of work. 1 ' The court further
stated that it is important to consider the rising cost of living and the
2
fact that one has an inherent desire to improve his standard of living.'
Therefore, for the purpose of entering the ranks of the compensated unemployed, the quitting of one's employment must be for such
reasons as would motivate the average reasonable man in a similar
position to do the same.1 3
In insurance programs, it is a cardinal rule that insurance does
not cover losses willfully caused by the insured. However, there are
circumstances which have been considered to be reasonable and justified
for the worker to quit his employment and then receive unemployment
benefits if he cannot find other employment. The controversies have
arisen not over the payment of benefits to those who have voluntarily
quit, but, instead, as to what constitutes "good cause" for leaving em14
ployment.
If a worker leaves his employment voluntarily in any state, it must
be for "good cause." Otherwise, he will not qualify for unemployment
benefits. Most states restrict "good cause," to such as may be attributable to the employer or connected with the work. 15 The Ohio Revised Code states:
No individual may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits for
the duration of his unemployment if the administrator finds that he
quit his work without just cause or has been discharged for just
cause in connection with his work. 16
Therefore, "good cause" for leaving employment must be connected
with the claimant's employment, and the test becomes one of whether
8 Hackenberg v. Catherwood, 31 App. Div. 2d 577, 294 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1968); Haynes v.
Catherwood, 30 App. Div. 2d 722, 291 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1968).

9 OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4141.01-.99 (Baldwin 1964).
10 Layton v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 218 N.E.2d 767 (Ohio C.P.
Erie County 1965).
11 Id.

12 Layton v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 218 N.E2d 767 (Ohio C.P.
Erie County 1965).
13 Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
358 Pa. 224, 56 A.2d 254 (1948).
14 HABER AND MURRAY, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE ECONOMY 292 (1966).
15 HABER AND MURRAY, supra note 14, at 114-115.

16 Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(D) (2) (a) (Baldwin 1964).
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7
the employee left for "good cause" connected with his employment.1
Based on this test, if an employee leaves work because of pregnancy,18
or to get married, 19 or to follow her spouse to another locality, 20 , she
will not be entitled to receive unemployment benefits. There are, however, certain extraneous factors, or personal reasons, in the absence
of a statutory provision requiring the cause for leaving employment be
connected with the work, which may be considered to be "good cause." 21
In a recent New York decision, it was held that "earlier than usual
work, reasonably required by an employer's business and not adversely
affecting the claimant, was not, as a matter of law, 'good cause' for
leaving employment." 22 On the other hand, it has been held, in Ohio,
that unemployment resulting from a refusal to transfer from daytime
employment to the night shift, because the place of employment at night
would cause an average female employee to fear for her safety was a
voluntary quitting with "just cause" and did not bar the claimant from
unemployment benefits.23 Therefore, to constitute "good cause," the reasons for which an employee is compelled to leave his employment must
24
be real, substantial, and reasonable.
Any type of whimsical reason for leaving work will bar a claimant
from receiving benefits, because, as stated in Hrebar v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review:

The vitalizing element of "good cause" is "good faith" and "good
faith" embraces not only the merely negative virtue of freedom
from fraud but also positive conduct which is consistent
with a
25
genuine desire to work and to be self-supporting.
The Hrebar case is supported by a New York decision stating that a
claimant who had operated a manual and an electric comptometer and
then quit when the electric machine was no longer available, after being
told to simply do her best with the manually operated machine, quit
28
without good cause.
A claimant can be disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance if he is discharged for just cause, 2 as a case where an individual has failed to report for work after numerous warnings by his
Harp v. Adm'r, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 230 N.E.2d 376 (Ohio
C.P. Hamilton County 1967).
18 Leach v. Columbus Plastics Products, Inc., 194 N.E.2d 469 (Ohio C.P. Franklin
County 1962).
19 Moore v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 73 Ohio App. 362, 56 N.E.2d
520 (1943).
20 Farloo v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 145 Ohio St. 263, 61 N.E.2d 313 (1945); BrownBrockmeyer Co. v. Herschberger, 67 N.E.2d 820 (Ct. App. Ohio 1944).
21 Flannick v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 168 Pa. Super. 606, 82
A.2d 671 (1951).
22 Vernaskas v. Fumex Sanitation, Inc., 35 App, Div. 2d 618, 312 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1970).
23 Reeves v. Board of Review of Unemployment Compensation, 118 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio
C.P. Cuyahoga County 1953).
24 Duquesne Brewing Co. of Pittsburgh v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 359 Pa. 535, 59 A.2d 913 (1948).
25 179 Pa. Super. 103, 116 A.2d 93, 95 (1955).
26 DeCicco v. Catherwood, 24 App. Div. 2d 666, 261 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1965).
2T OHio REV. CODE AmN. § 4141.29 (D) (2) (a) (Baldwin 1964).
17
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individual may be eligible for benefits
29
is able to work, and is available for suitable work, but he must be
0
actively seeking such suitable work.8
The Unemployment Compensation Act also fails to grant benefits to
those who refuse without good cause to accept offered suitable work:
No individual may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits for the
duration of employment if the administrator finds that he has refused without good cause to accept an offer of suitable work when
made by an employer . . . or has refused or failed to investigate a
referral to work when directed to do so by a local employment of28

fice...

31

The question which now arises is, what can be considered to be
suitable work? Suitable work is a question of fact to be determined by
the trier of the facts.3 2 In Shay v. Unemployment Compensation Board
of Review, the appellants had been denied unemployment benefits, after
they were laid off because they were offered work as laborers, at a considerable reduction in wages. One claimant was a carpenter for fourteen years and the other was a bricklayer with eight years' experience.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the decision on the grounds
that the lower court had refused to consider what was "suitable" work,
in view of the claimants' training and experience which are "inevitable
touchstones of deliberation." 33
The Ohio Revised Code expressly provides guidelines for the administrator, the trier of fact, to determine what is suitable work:
In determining whether any work is suitable for a claimant . . .
the administrator shall . . . consider the degree of risk to the claimant's health, safety, and morale, his physical fitness for the work,
his prior training and experience, the length of his employment, the
from his residence, and his prospects
distance of the available 3work
4
for obtaining local work.
35
specifies certain
However, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
conditions by which a state cannot disqualify a claimant for refusing
new work. These conditions were designed so that a worker could re37
36
or
fuse a job where a labor dispute existed, where hours, wages,
working conditions are substandard, or where his right to join a bona
fide labor union would be restricted.38 It must be remembered, though,
that all the facts and circumstances are considered when determining

Ohio Ferro-Alloys Corp. v. Tichnor, 168 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio C.P. Muskingum County
1959).
28

29 Wallace v. Bonded Oil Co., 152 N.E.2d 172 (Ohio C.P. Clark County 1958).
30 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29 (A) (4) (Baldwin 1964).
31 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29 (D) (2) (b) (Baldwin 1964).
32 Pennington v. Dudley, 10 Ohio St. 2d 90, 226 N.E.2d 738 (1967); Linker v. Catherwood, 27 App. Div. 2d 884, 277 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1967).
33 424 Pa. 287, 227 A.2d 174 (1967).
34 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29 (F)

(Baldwin 1964).

35 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3304(a) (5).
36 Linker v. Catherwood, 27 App. Div. 2d 884, 277 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1967).
37 Kotlowitz v. Catherwood, 24 App. Div. 2d 813, 263 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1965).
38 Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29 (E) (1) (1) (Baldwin 1964).
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whether a refusal of offered employment was with "good cause." In
Palmer v. State Bureau of Unemployment, a seamstress was offered

evening employment as a waitress at half her usual wage. She refused
the offer because she had never worked as a waitress before and, if she
accepted, would have had to hire a baby sitter. The Court ruled that
her refusal was with "good cause." 39
Another consideration for refusal with "good cause" of offered employment is whether such new employment is
at an unreasonable distance from the worker's residence. Consideration should also be given to the character of the work he has been
accustomed to do, and whether travel to the place of work involves expenses substantially greater than that
40 required for his former work, unless the expense is provided for.
Therefore, while the person must be available for work in order to receive unemployment benefits, his availability depends upon whether or
not there is suitable work in the community. 4 1 Notwithstanding other
factors, in determining what is "good cause" for leaving employment,
one of the major considerations is the "consistency of one's conduct with
a reasonably evidenced intent and desire to be at work and be selfsupporting." 42 As the Bureau of Employment Security has put it,
The qualifying requirement and the requirement that claimants be
able and available for work are the two halves of a single requirebe limited to unemployed members of the
ment that protection
labor force. 43
An employer has the privilege of writing into employment contracts
certain provisions for which an employee may be discharged for "just
cause." 44 One example of such a provision might be calling for mandatory retirement at the age of sixty-five. Therefore, when an employee
reaches this age, and is at that time discharged, it can be said that he
has been discharged for "just cause" and will not be entitled to receive
unemployment insurance benefits. 41 Under a different type of provision, an employee can be discharged for a violation of a labor contract
by reporting for work in an intoxicated condition or under the influence
of intoxicating liquor, and such discharge will be deemed to be within
the scope and meaning of "discharge for just cause in connection with
his work," thus denying the employee unemployment benefits.46 However, if an employee is discharged only because of a misunderstanding
39 177 N.E.2d 806 (Ohio C.P. Scioto County 1961).
40 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29 (E) (3) (Baldwin 1964).
41 Kontner v. Board of Review, 148 Ohio St. 614, 76 N.E.2d 611 (1947); Leach v.
Board of Review, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 115 Ohio App. 235, 178

N.E.2d 94 (1961).

42 Dept. of Indus. Relations v. Mann, 35 Ala. App. 505, 50 So. 2d 780, 783 (1950).
43 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, "UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LEGISLATIVE POLICY, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATE LEGISLATION

1962," BES No. U-212A, October, 1962, at 44.
44 Mathieu v. Dudley, 10 Ohio App. 2d 169, 226 N.E.2d 763 (1967).
45 Leach v. Columbus Coated Fabrics Co., 205 N.E.2d 608 (Ohio C.P. Franklin County
1964).
46 Hawkins v. Leach, 115 Ohio App. 259, 185 N.E.2d 36 (1961).
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between himself and the employer, such discharge is not for "just
cause." 47

Our society has a system which doles out cash payments for wage
loss due to unemployment, and it is not illogical for the legislatures of
the several states to deny such payments to those individuals who are
voluntarily unemployed. These unemployment benefits were not designed to make up for lost wages of a worker whose behavior leads to
unemployment for which neither the community nor an employer has a
responsibility. 48 Therefore, disqualification from unemployment compensation benefits has become a necessary part of unemployment insurance legislation.
As in any typical insurance policy, the conditions for unemployment
benefits or compensation to be paid are spelled out in detail. A regular
insurance policy will also spell out conditions or exceptions under
which benefits will not be paid. Therefore, it is not surprising to find
that there are certain limitations which have been included in unemployment compensation statutes, for the purpose of limiting compensation to involuntary unemployment. However, the purpose is not to disqualify workers from all voluntary unemployment.
A worker is disqualified from benefits only when the voluntary
leaving is "without good cause," or when discharge with misconduct is "connected with the work," or if he refuses "suitable" work.
or reThus, the laws allow for cases in which quitting, discharge,
49
fusal of work is justified and so is not disqualifying.
47 Coey v. Burwell Nurseries, 2 Ohio App. 2d 102, 206 N.E.2d 577 (1965).
48 HABER AND MURAY, supra note 14, at 281.
19 HABER AND MURAY, supra note 14, at 284.
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